State v. Miranda

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

RICARDO ADOLPHO MIRANDA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0346
FILED 11-7-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2017-105084-002
The Honorable Howard D. Sukenic, Judge, Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Kevin M. Morrow
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Stephen M. Johnson, Inc., Phoenix
By Stephen M. Johnson
Counsel for Appellant
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Ricardo Adolfo Miranda appeals his conviction for first-
degree murder and drive by shooting. Because we find no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Miranda was visiting his uncle’s home when a man walked
past the house and caught his uncle’s attention. The uncle told Miranda he
had previously seen this man with a knife in the neighborhood, and the
uncle believed he was casing the house. Miranda left the house to follow
the man. Miranda later drove past the man in a dark-colored pickup truck
and shot him five times.

¶3 Miranda fled the scene and called his cousin Tania, admitting
he had shot someone and “wanted to leave the state.” Tania obliged. She
drove Miranda and his family to a house in California.

¶4 By the time police arrived, the victim was dead. Police
recovered a 40-caliber shell casing and projectile fragments at the scene.
Police also discovered security cameras across the street, which recorded
the victim, a dark four-door truck and taillights consistent with a Chevrolet
truck. A witness also reported seeing a dark four-door pickup truck.

¶5 About a week later, police received an anonymous tip
connecting Miranda and his cousin Tania to the murder. Police verified
that Miranda drove a dark-red 2007 Chevrolet four-door pickup truck,
which was registered in his name. And by using cell phone data, police
placed Miranda at the scene of the murder when it occurred. They also
placed Tania between Phoenix and California later that night and the next
morning.

¶6 Police found and interrogated Tania, who admitted that
Miranda had confessed to her and sought help fleeing the state. Tania
admitted that she returned Miranda’s truck to him in California about a
month after the shooting. Police found the truck’s passenger-side mirror in

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her apartment. A bullet had damaged the mirror, entering through the
mirror’s face and exiting out the back casing.

¶7 Four months after the shooting, Los Angeles sheriff deputies
and Phoenix police served a search warrant on the California house, where
they found and seized Miranda’s four-door Chevrolet, which had a 40-
caliber handgun in the center consol. The handgun contained Miranda’s
DNA and ballistically matched a shell casing found at the scene of the
shooting. The gun’s serial number was scraped off. Police also found
gunshot residue on the truck’s passenger side, which corresponded with
the bullet-damaged mirror.

¶8 The State charged Miranda with first-degree murder and
drive-by-shooting. A fifteen-day trial was held. During trial, the State
called Tania as a witness, but she claimed not to recall what she told police
during the interrogation. Over Miranda’s objection, the superior court
allowed Detective Gonzalez to testify about Tania’s statements during his
interrogation. Miranda also requested special jury instructions on
involuntariness, which the court denied. Finally, the court precluded
Miranda from presenting a third-party defense. The jury found Miranda
guilty on both counts. He appeals. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12–
120.21(A)(1), 13–4031, –4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Miranda raises several arguments on appeal. We analyze
each in turn.

I. The California Search Warrant

¶10 Miranda first argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because of factual inaccuracies in the California search warrant and
attachments. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). We review the
superior court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284 (1996). But we review de novo
the denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing. Frimmel v. Sanders, 236
Ariz. 232, 238, ¶ 25 (App. 2014).

¶11 To get an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978), Miranda must demonstrate the search warrant or warrant
affidavit contained “specific allegations of deliberate falsehoods or reckless
disregard for the truth.” Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 30. But Miranda
identified no false statements in these documents. Instead, he alleged
inaccuracies in the “Return to Search Warrant,” which was filed after the

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search was conducted. Without false statements on the search warrant
affidavits or the warrant itself, a Franks hearing was not required.

¶12 Miranda also argues the search was invalid because police
officers violated California statutes. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 1530, 1536. We
need not address the merits of these claims, however, because neither
Arizona law nor California law recognize an exclusionary remedy for a
statutory defect. See A.R.S. § 13–3925(A); People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55, 64
(Cal. 2010). We find no abuse of discretion.

II. Detective Gonzalez’s Testimony

¶13 Miranda next claims that Detective Gonzalez should not have
been allowed to testify about Tania’s interrogation statements because it
violated the Confrontation Clause and her statements were hearsay. We
review de novo challenges to admissibility based on the Confrontation
Clause, State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 333, ¶ 31 (2008), but review evidentiary
decisions for an abuse of discretion, State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 564, ¶ 77
(2014), and will affirm the decision if correct for any reason, State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984).

¶14 Detective Gonzalez’s testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Both Tania and Detective
Gonzalez testified at trial and were subject to cross-examination. See State
v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54, 63, ¶ 36 (2005) (“[T]he main and essential purpose
of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
examination.”) (cleaned up). And the Confrontation Clause is not violated
just because a declarant forgets her prior statement. See State v. Real, 214
Ariz. 232, 235, ¶ 10 (App. 2007). We find no error.

¶15 Second, Detective Gonzalez’s testimony about Tania’s and
Miranda’s statements was not hearsay. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 805.
Miranda’s incriminating statements to Tania are opposing party’s
statements. Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Tania’s interrogation statements are
prior inconsistent statements by a witness subject to cross examination.
Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). Because neither statement was hearsay,
Detective Gonzalez’s testimony was proper.

¶16 Even if admissible, however, we may exclude a prior
inconsistent statement when used for purposes beyond impeachment
under Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 801(d)(1)(A). See generally, State
v. Cruz, 128 Ariz. 538, 540 (1981); State v. Allred, 134 Ariz. 274 (1982). We
“focus on the danger of unfair prejudice when the impeaching testimony is

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used for substantive purposes,” and weigh that prejudice against the
probative value of the testimony under Rule 403. Allred, 134 Ariz. at 277.

¶17 We consider five factors, including whether:

1) the witness being impeached denies making the
impeaching statement, and 2) the witness presenting the
impeaching statement has an interest in the proceeding and
there is no other corroboration that the statement was made,
or 3) there are other factors affecting the reliability of the
impeaching witness, such as age or mental capacity, . . . 4) the
true purpose of the offer is substantive use of the statement
rather than impeachment of the witness, 5) the impeachment
testimony is the only evidence of guilt.

Id.

¶18 We discern no error. These factors weigh in favor of
admitting the testimony. Tania never denied she was interrogated. See
State v. Sucharew, 205 Ariz. 16, 24 (App. 2003) (distinguishing Cruz because
“this is not a case where the witness denied the existence of any such
conversation.”). Detective Gonzalez was not considered an interested
witness. State v. Miller, 187 Ariz. 254 (App. 1996) (“A police officer is not
per se ‘interested’ merely by virtue of his or her involvement in a criminal
investigation”). The record contained evidence of guilt beyond the
testimony in question. And Detective Gonzalez’s testimony was
corroborated: he took contemporaneous notes of the interrogation, the
interrogation was recorded, and Detective Gonzalez reviewed the
recording before testifying. See State v. Beck, 151 Ariz. 130, 133 (App. 1986)
(“where the witness does not deny making the statements and where the
impeaching witness is competent and the statements are corroborated, Rule
403 . . . does not require exclusion of the evidence due to its prejudicial
effect.”).

III. Jury Instructions

¶19 Miranda next argues the superior court should have
instructed the jury on witness voluntariness because Tania’s interrogation
statements might have been involuntary. We review the refusal of a jury
instruction for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hurley, 197 Ariz. 400, 402,
¶ 9 (App. 2000).

¶20 Parties are entitled to jury instructions “on any theory of the
case reasonably supported by the evidence,” State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz.

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585, 588 (1983), but the superior court need not give an instruction that
“does not fit the facts of the particular case, or is adequately covered by the
other instructions,” State v. Hussain, 189 Ariz. 336, 337 (App. 1997).

¶21 Here, the evidence does not reasonably show that Tania’s
statements were involuntary. Tania was handcuffed during her
interrogation, but that alone does not show coercion. See State v. Moody, 208
Ariz. 424, 468, ¶¶ 200–01 (2004). Without a showing that a witness’
statements were coerced, a jury instruction on voluntariness was
inappropriate. Additionally, the superior court provided the standard
instructions on witness credibility, which adequately cover witness
voluntariness. See RAJI Stand. Crim. 15. The court did not abuse its
discretion.

IV. Third Party Claim

¶22 Finally, Miranda argues he was entitled to present a third-
party defense implicating Aaron Saucedo, known as “the Maryvale
Shooter,” as the murderer. We review the admissibility of third-party
culpability evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157,
161, ¶ 21 (2002). We find no error.

¶23 Third-party culpability evidence is not relevant under Rule
401 when it “offers only a possible ground of suspicion against another.”
Prion, 203 Ariz. at 161, ¶ 21. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 402. At a minimum,
such evidence must “create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”
State v. Gibson, 202 Ariz. 321, 324, ¶ 16 (2002).

¶24 Miranda did not meet this standard. He offered no evidence
connecting Saucedo to the shooting, the victim or the weapon. Murder
suspects do not automatically receive a third-party defense just because a
serial shooter is active in the city. This evidence also confuses the issues
and misleads the jury under Rule 403. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403; State v.
Machado, 226 Ariz. 281, 284, ¶ 16, n.2 (2011). The superior court properly
excluded the evidence.

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CONCLUSION

¶25 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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